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i n f o

ab stract
State and local government pension underfunding has become a major focus of public policy debate due
in large part to recent Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB) actions that have brought na
tional attention to the issue. The extent of these plans underfunding has been debated, along with the
necessity for state government intervention and the level of regulatory actions that should be enacted
by state legislatures. State and local public pension plans do not fall under the enumerated powers of
the federal government in the Constitution and are therefore left to each individual state to regulate. The
amount of plan underfunding and enacted public policy by state varies greatly. Additionally, in contrast to
numerous state balanced-budget laws, legal directives for fully funding public pensions are virtually non
existent. This paper analyzes the state and local public pension crisis, examines current and long-term
risk, studies public employee fiscal conditions, considers the societal impacts of these plans, considers
the strengths and weakness of pension plan types, recommends public policy and regulation, and offers
strategies for managers, board members, and public officials to adopt.
© 2018 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction

Public pension plans date back to the 1870's when New York
City police officers were granted lifetime payments at age 55 after
21 years of service. In comparison, the first private sector plan was
established in 1875 by the American Express Company. This plan
created the framework for other pension plans to follow by includ
ing retirement age, longevity, and percentage of annual salary as
a basis for providing retirement income. In their case, it was 60
years of age, with 20 years of continuous service, providing 50%
of income level at retirement (Stone, 1984). In 1911, Massachusetts
became the first state to create a pension plan for all general state
employees (NCPERS, 2003). The growth of public plans continued
through the 1960's when virtually all public service employees
were covered by some type of public retirement benefits. These
payments generally came in the form of defined benefits (DB) that
guaranteed a fixed income to the retired employee for life. This
is in contrast to the newer form of pension plans called defined
contribution (DC) which are 401(k) type plans where employ
ees and employers contribute to employee-controlled investment
accounts.
For nearly a century and a half, there has been little concern for
or discussion regarding the solvency of public DB pension plans

and payments to retirees have continued to flow. Over the years,
many of these plans have not been managed properly, and now
have large future pension liabilities for retirees without the assets
to cover them. Recently, the GASB has required that any unfunded
pension liabilities be reported on state and local government bal
ance sheets and the expected rate of return used in calculating the
liability.
These new requirements bring significant transformation to de
termining and reporting pension liabilities. It has been shown that
bond investors have already adjusted and taken into account the
unfunded pension liability in both the private sector (Shaw, 2008)
and in the public sector (Foltin et al., 2017). Therefore, the big
ger impact of these standards may be the heightened awareness
GASB has brought to the public regarding underfunding and li
ability amount. Discount rate, assumptions regarding future re
turns, amount of benefits, and investment decisions have become
a matter of public debate. Policy change and media coverage have
greatly increased since GASB focused attention on the issue espe
cially with the most troubled pension funds.
Several pension funds across the country experienced much
publicized troubles with their plans. State plans in California, Illi
nois, New Jersey, and Kentucky, and municipal plans like Chicago,
Detroit, and Dallas, have been forced to take action due to low
funding levels. These events along with GASB’s actions have turned
a spotlight on the funding of public pensions. Fund management,
board inaction, elected official indecisiveness, taxpayer funding,

Exhibit 1. Funded Percentage Plan Assets in Proportion to Accrued Pension Liability.
Source: Pew Charitable Trusts (2018).

expected returns, investment decisions, and benefits to employees
have all come under scrutiny. Actions to remedy these issues have
so far largely dealt with benefit cuts by altering the mechanics
of the plans, such as reducing cost of living adjustments (COLA),
cutting benefit amounts, increasing retirement age, and even
moving to DC plans (Foltin et al., 2018). However, the heart of
the problem - policy, regulation, and governance - has remained
untouched and virtually unmentioned.

2. Pension plan underfunding

Public pension underfunding amounts vary depending on the
methodology used in calculating liabilities. Pew Charitable Trusts
(Craig, 2018) estimates the deficit at $1.4 trillion based upon Com
prehensive Annual Financial Reports, actuarial reports, and public
financial statements. In contrast, Stanford University’s Hoover In
stitution study (Rauh, 2017) places the amount at $3.8 trillion.
The difference in estimates is attributable to the long-range
projected rate of return. It has been shown that discount rates
can be manipulated to meet the needs of an entity through lower
ing the liability on the balance sheet or lowering pension expense
on the income statement (Fried, Davis-Friday, & Davis, 2014). Pew
used the actual rates of return applied by the pension funds: a 7.5%
average rate. The Stanford study uses a weighted average, plan-byplan rate tied to the treasury yield which generates a 2.7% annual
projected rate of return. The most realistic discount rate and ac
tual deficit most likely lies somewhere between these two figures
and will continue to provide debate in state legislatures and on a
national level.
Private sector research has studied the use of International Ac
counting Standards in which the long-term expected rate of re
turn on pension plan assets has been eliminated. However, this
has shown to have a great impact on firms with “extreme” lev
els of funded status (Bauman & Shaw, 2016). Using the Pew Data,
Exhibit 1 lists all the states and their funded percentages.
Under both the Pew and Hoover Institute methodologies, pen
sion deficits have been rising and funded percentages are decreas
ing. The 2018 Pew study shows 44 of 50 states experienced a
decrease in their funded pension percentage, with Wisconsin be
ing the only state with any improvement at 1%. Although 2017

numbers are expected to improve, most long-term forecasts pre
dict continued strain on public pension funds (Foltin et.al, 2018).

3. Pension reforms and fiscal stability

The National Association of State Retirement Administrators
(NARSA) (Brainard & Brown, 2016) reports that in the last decade,
every state has passed pension reform legislation, with most leg
islative changes having a negative impact on the level of em
ployee benefits awarded. Employees are now required to pay more
than they have in the past. Forty states lowered benefits by ei
ther changing formulas used to calculate benefits, reducing COLA,
and/or requiring employees to work longer. Increased contribu
tions and cuts in benefits are even more dramatic for newly hired
employees.
Five states: Michigan, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Utah, and Vir
ginia, have created combination DB/DC plans. Kansas and Ken
tucky created cash balance plans for new employees where the
employer puts in a percentage of employee salary and provides a
nominal interest rate. Although cash balance plans are still consid
ered DB plans, they are a big step closer to DC plans and another
shift away from traditional DB plans. Arizona and Oklahoma closed
their traditional DB plans for all new hires with DC being the only
option. Many of these pension changes have been declared suc
cessful, have received praise from public officials, and have indeed
made strides toward reducing governmental pension underfunding.
The Manhattan Institute (DiSalvo, 2015) and the Brookings Institute
(McGuinn, 2014) even use some of the above-mentioned states as
best practice case studies for other governments seeking to reduce
pension deficits.
Consensus by policymakers does not necessarily demonstrate
success. Crisis has brought opportunity to make pension benefit
cuts. Wong (2016) writes that keeping politics out of pension fund
decisions will benefit fund performance. Whether politics or gen
uine concern for the financial stability of pension funds is the driv
ing force behind policy changes, dramatic change is occurring. Af
ter reviewing pension reforms enacted by states, actions by public
officials to increase employee contributions, cut benefits, and shift
toward DC plans are having a positive impact on the stability of
funds - at the very least, the decline is less.

Company

Amount

Year

Caterpillar

$16.5

2009

Hartford/Neuberger Berman

$13.9

2009

Bechtel

$18.5

2010

General Dynamics

$15.1

2010

Walmart/Merrill Lynch

$13.5

2011

Kraft

$9.5

2012

Cigna

$35

2013

International Paper

$30

2014

Voya

$15

2014

Lockheed Martin

$62

2015

Boeing

$57

2015

Ameriprise

$27.5

2015

MassMutual

$30

2016

TIAA

$8.9

2017

Exhibit 2. 401(k) Settlements (in millions).
Source: Wilcox Volz and Laermer (2017).

Although the focus has been on solidifying the financial condi
tion of public pension funds, it is still early enough in the process
of public pension restructuring for other factors such as employee
welfare and societal impact to be taken into account.
4. Shifting risk - Are employees equipped?
Most of the focus surrounding the pension crisis is on the fi
nancial soundness of the funds and how to fix the underfund
ing. The employee’s ability to manage money and their long-term
financial well-being in retirement is often overshadowed by the
problem garnering the most attention - the underfunding. The em
phasis has been on the liability, not asset management and em
ployee security. The fiscal realities that most public sector Ameri
can workers are faced with has been largely overlooked.
The University of California Berkley Haas Institute study
(Sgouros, 2017) contends that DC plans are not in the best interest
of employees or a feasible solution to the looming public employee
retirement crisis. The study cites higher administrative costs for DC
plans and the difficulty for an individual to successfully save an ap
propriate amount in a DC plan to live on for the rest of their life.
Moreover, the motivation of the private sector toward DC plans is
marked by bias and the desire to repurpose capital.
Another related problem is putting this risk and responsibility
of saving and high-level investment decision making on the indi
vidual employee. Moving investment and mortality risk to employ
ees without sophisticated financial knowledge creates uncertainty
and takes away the security of DB plans. Big business or large gov
ernments have more expertise to make investment decisions, more
influence in dealing with investment managers, and the financial
wherewithal to weather a financial crisis.
Merton (2014) predicts a major retirement crisis as baby
boomers begin to retire. He argues that DC plans wrongly focus
on fund value and return rather than the income needed upon

retirement. Merton also asserts it is dangerous and illogical to put
complex investment decisions in the hands of individuals with lit
tle financial expertise. This thought is supported by Clark et al.
(2010) who have shown that older workers are not well informed
about company and national retirement plans. The lack of finan
cial literacy of most workers and retirees is certainly a factor that
must be considered if retirement plans are to provide individuals
with sufficient financial resources in retirement.
In addition, the financial service firms that manage DC plans
bring potential vulnerability that could place retirees at risk. For
example, the Teachers Insurance and Annuity Corporation (TIAA),
the leading retirement investment provider for five million work
ers and retirees in academic and public service, has recently come
under scrutiny for the management of its plans. TIAA manages
a trillion dollars in retirement and other assets. Recent lawsuits
and whistle-blower complaints by a group of former workers con
tend that TIAA is pushing customers into investments that do not
add value, are not in the employees’ best interest, and are pro
moted to generate higher fees for TIAA rather than for the ben
efit of members of the plan. Other DC plan managers have also
been under fire by members. Thus far, there has been over $400
million awarded by various 401(k) plans to employees and re
tirees in lawsuits for conflicts of interest over investment decisions
and oversize fees (Wilcox Volz & Laermer, 2017). Some major lit
igation awards are shown in Exhibit 2. The lack of profit motive
in government-managed DB plans mitigates this additional risk
exposure.
Further adding to the retirement plan problem is the fact
that most individuals approaching retirement age simply have not
saved or invested sufficient resources to live on. The Government
Accountability Office (GAO, 2015) found that about half of house
holds age 55 and older have no retirement savings such as a 401(k)
plan or IRA. This study found from one-third to two-thirds of
workers are at risk of falling short of targeted retirement savings.

Participation rates in private retirement plans are heavily based
upon individual economic situations, or the haves vs. the havenots. For example, high-income professional workers participate at
a rate that is 44% higher than those individuals working in the ser
vice area (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2016).
Another often unnoticed factor in the debate over public sec
tor retirement plans is the fact that many public workers are not
eligible for social security. With no source of federal retirement,
state and local government workers are even more vulnerable to
economic pressures in retirement.
5. Societal impact

The impact of depleted public pension plans on society goes be
yond what some consider a moral obligation to provide a sustain
able income for individuals who have worked their career in the
public sector. Drucker (1976) first presented the concept of pension
fund socialism. At the time, pension funds owned 25% of the eq
uity capital of American business and had a strong position in the
nation’s largest companies. Drucker predicted that by 1985, pen
sion funds would own 50% of the equity capital of American busi
ness. Drucker characterized this ownership of business by workers
through pension funds as socialism. However, corporate DB plan
funds started their decline around this time, with 78% of all em
ployees participating in a DB pension fund in 1975 as compared
to 27% participation by 2015 (US Department of Labor, 2018). It
is clear that the pension fund socialism theory did not come to
fruition and is evidenced by comparing current private pension
fund assets of $1.3 trillion, and public pension fund assets of nearly
$4 trillion versus the overall market capitalization of US domestic
companies of $27 trillion.
With the decrease in members and money comes a weakening
of employee influence on corporate America, their boards, and de
cisions. An individual 401(k) holder loses not only the influence of
large public plans, but also loses the power to file lawsuits and the
ability to consult with investment managers. Without pension fund
representation, shareholder activism of employees is diminished.
Despite the fall of the private sector plans, public pension plans
can still carry significant weight. The bigger public pension funds
in the country continue to have an impact among institutional in
vestors. Despite declining membership across the country, espe
cially as public-sector unions have come under attack, David Web
ber (2018), calls public pension funds - organized labor’s most
potent weapon remaining.
Finally, employees in the U.S. are working longer than they ever
have. The United States Bureau of Labor Statistics (Toossi & Torpey, 2017) reports that workers 55 years of age and over now make
up 23% of the total workforce, up from 13.1% in 2000. This number
is expected to rise to nearly 25% by 2020. Public pension reforms
will help perpetuate this trend, as workers are forced to work
longer to afford retirement. In addition, there is less opportunity
for younger workers since older workers are still in their positions.
This extended work life that America’s society is implementing is
due in large part to the decrease in DB plans and unpreparedness
of individuals in DC plans. This is another consideration for public
pension reform, especially for those serving in public safety.
6. Cost versus benefits of defined benefit plans

As the research cited in the previous two sections demonstrate,
it can be argued that public sector employees are ill-equipped to
manage DC plans and DB plans are a value to society. However,
it can just as easily be claimed that they are an unwarranted fi
nancial burden on government budgets and an unfair expense to
citizens. Guaranteed retirement benefits for life can be debated as
a societal and cultural argument - one of human personal need

vs. government economic stability. Issues such as retirement age,
amount of benefit, and cost to taxpayers are all valid considera
tions which have no right or wrong answer. For most Americans
who work in the private sector, the debate is all but over. The vast
majority of people in the U.S. working in corporate America belong
to DC plans. Now the discussion moves to the government sector
where the eventual financial drain falls to the taxpayer. Exhibit 3
details the strengths and weaknesses of DB plans.
The advantages of DB plans primarily center around the benefit
to the employee, while the disadvantages primarily focus on cost
to the employer and the fiscal soundness of the government entity
supported by taxpayer dollars.
As the data in this study reveals, most of the changes have
trended toward improving the fiscal soundness of the respective
governments primarily through reduction of benefits. However, an
example of a less common resolution lies in the City of Chicago,
where lower employee contributions, cost of living adjustments
and lower retirement age were maintained in favor of a nearly 30%
increase in water and sewer rates. This was implemented to fund
the distressed city workers pension fund. The strong union struc
ture in Chicago may have played a role in this outcome.
There are some business case arguments that support the con
cept of DB plans. In the private sector, firms with DB plans had
increased book value, earnings and market value after pension dis
closure standards were promulgated (Houmes, Boylan, & Crosby,
2012). This shows not only improved reporting quality, but pos
sibly an intangible value to the firm that maintains DB plans.
Another business case claim in support of DB plans lies with
the ability of state and local governments to be competitive in the
labor market. A new study shows that recent pension cuts hurt
governments’ ability to recruit quality workers especially consider
ing that the private sector typically pays higher wages for similar
positions (Quinby, Sanzenbacher, & Aubry, 2018).
Alternately, one cannot ignore the cost of public pensions.
These costs as a percentage of state budgets comprise 4.7% of all
state and local government spending (NARSA, 2017). When addi
tional dollars go into pensions, other areas such as parks, educa
tion, and social programs lose budgetary funding. When consid
ering addressing the unfunded pension deficit, the impact on the
budget is even greater. Depending on what discount rate is used,
the percentage of state and local government budgets that it would
take to fully fund public pensions could be as much as 20%. The
fairness of taxpayers carrying this burden should be considered,
especially since these taxpayers predominantly participate in DC
plans.
The choices for policymakers are difficult and often influenced
by the overall financial prosperity of a state and the political struc
ture as seen in Chicago.
7. Policy authority and influence

Each individual state government holds exclusive control over
all state and local government pensions. Due to the United States
Constitution’s Tenth Amendment in the Bill of Rights, (U.S., 1789),
the federal government can only exercise those rights specifically
granted in the Constitution: “The powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or the people.” Al
though the federal government has made some attempts to regu
late states in areas such as municipal securities through the Secu
rities and Exchange Commission and by means of self-regulatory
agencies such as the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board, little
has been done to penetrate the individual states’ control of such
issues (Foltin, 2017).
With public pension funds exclusively under state and local
government control, they are not covered under the Employee

Strength
Employee Security
Earlier retirement age for employees
Makes governments more competitive
for hiring talented individuals
Employee investment risk is reduced
Provides public employees a voice on
corporate operations
Promotes stability and reduces
turnover
Government entities financially
stronger and possess better ability to
manage assets
Less volatility in employee
contributions and distributions
Less investment and management fees

Increased transparency

Weakness
Fiscal cost to the government entity
Losing talent earlier, paying pension
benefits sooner and longer
Obligation to the entity spans for
decades
Risk falls to the government
Employees do not maintain control of
their investments
Longer vesting period for the employee
- pension value often lost until vested
Fosters financial illiteracy for public
employees
Restrictions on withdrawal of funds
Employee autonomy in choosing
investments lost
The liability amounts difficult to explain
and understand

Exhibit 3. Strengths and Weaknesses of Defined Benefit Pension Plans for Public Employees.

Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, which sets standards re
quired by law for all private sector plans. Similarly, if a public
sector plan runs into severe financial trouble as is happening in
many states today, there is no payment assurance for retirees
through the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation. All regulation
and standard setting in regard to management, investing, bene
fits, actuarial estimates, vesting, and funding is the responsibility
of state lawmakers.
8. State budget policy implications

State regulation ensuring fully funded pension funds is virtually
non-existent. However, most states have formal balanced budget
requirements, meaning states must generate sufficient revenue to
meet operating expenditures in any given year. Any surpluses can
typically be used to help balance a budget. The National Confer
ence of State Legislatures NCSL (2010) reports that 49 states (with
Vermont being the only exception) have balanced budget regula
tions in their state Constitutions or have enacted laws requiring a
balanced budget. The National Association of State Budget Officers
(NASBO, 2015) reports similar findings. These balanced budget laws
may come in the form of the Governor’s submitted budget, the leg
islature passed budget, ending carryover deficit, or combinations of
all three.
Some argue that many balanced budget laws are not
strong enough. The American Legislative Exchange Council
(Eucalitto, 2013) cites tactics used to circumvent balanced bud
get requirements such as shifting of money from different funds,
shifting payment dates to the following year, using debt, and us
ing unrealistic expected rates of return on pension payments. Bar
rett and Green (2011) assert that states often use adjusted fore
casts and loopholes as additional methods to evade the laws. The
Institute for Truth in Accounting (2009) has also demonstrated that
states use accounting to circumvent balanced budget legislation.
They performed a review of state annual reports that show that
the majority of states budgets are not balanced. Current financial
data also supports the argument that states are not truly comply
ing with balanced budget requirements and there is a large vari
ance in the fiscal health of the states. A Mercatus Center at George
Mason University Research study (Norcross and Gonzlaez, 2017)
ranks the fiscal health of states and shows many states are deal
ing with serious budgetary problems. The Center extrapolated data
from the audited financial reports of all 50 states using measures

of budget solvency, long-run solvency, service-level solvency, and
trust fund solvency. Exhibit 4 reports their findings. Three states in
the bottom five: Illinois, Kentucky, and New Jersey also rank in the
bottom five for largest deficits in underfunded pension systems.
Despite techniques used to bypass regulations and legislation,
the principles of balanced budget laws are well founded and
stronger regulations seem to be helpful. The Urban Institute (2017)
points to strong anti-deficit laws being associated with reduced
spending, smaller deficits, more rapid spending adjustments during
recessions, less debt, lower borrowing costs and higher surpluses.
In addition, the Mercatus Center (2017) study cites unfunded pen
sion liabilities as a major problem contributing to state budget dif
ficulties stating,

“High deficits and debt obligation in the forms of unfunded
pensions and healthcare benefits continue to drive each state
into fiscal peril. Each holds tens, if not hundreds, of billions of
dollars in unfunded liabilities-constituting a significant risk to
taxpayers in both the short and long-term.”
Based upon budget regulation as a case study, similar pension
regulatory reform at the state legislative level could be considered
by each state.
By reviewing the data on regulation surrounding balancing bud
gets, government regulation on a state-by-state basis could prove
even more effective in dealing with the pension crisis and prevent
ing it from getting worse in the future. Whether in support or op
position to the concept of DB plans, regulation could be helpful in
dealing with the underfunding problem. States that ensure com
pliance with budget balancing legislation have much better results
than those that allow ways around the intent of creating a bal
anced budget.

9. Strategy for regulatory reform

Although individual regulation and guidance must be adopted
on a state-by-state basis, generally accepted pension funding guid
ance can be created on a national level. Advantages and disadvan
tages of DB plans should be considered when developing new pol
icy. Even for states moving toward DC plans, the existing obligation
must be effectively addressed. A collaborative method with the
major professional organizations involved in recommending public
pension guidelines would likely be one effective approach.

Exhibit 4. Fiscal Conditions Ranking.
Derived using data from Mercatus Center (Norcross, 2017).

Organizations that should be considered for representation on
such a committee are the Government Finance Officers Association
(GFOA), the National Association of State Auditors, Comptrollers
and Treasurers (NASACT), the National Governors Association
(NGA), the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL), the
National Association of State Budget Officers (NASBO), The Na
tional Association of College and University Business Officers
(NACUBO), the National Association of State Retirement Adminis
trators (NARSA), and the American Accounting Association (AAA). A
role should also be considered for pension research institutes such
as The Pew Charitable Trusts, the Center for Retirement Research,
the Hoover Institute, the Urban Institute, and Mercatus Center. This
joint group should use the following as a foundation for developing
direction for regulation and guidelines for state managers, boards
and public officials to adopt in each state:
• Define fully funded and require all funds be funded at that

amount. The Government Accountability Office (2008) consid
ers 80% funding of pension liabilities as sufficiently funded be
cause public employers cannot go out of business like private
sector counterparts, and state and local governments spread the
liability over 20 or 30 years. In addition, it is difficult to accu
rately predict future economic events and numbers of govern
ment employees participating in any given plan and putting too
much aside will place too much burden on the funds and tax
payers. Even with 80% being considered fully funded, 38 states
currently fall below this fully funded mark. This, or a similarly
supported rate, should be the amount recommended by the na
tional board and approved by states as a legal requirement of
funding.
• A generally accepted variable discount rate should be agreed
to. A national variable discount rate should be researched and

subsequently recommended for approval on a state by state
basis. For example, a variable discount rate at 2.5% above the
10-year treasury rate based upon current rates would yield a
5.3% annual expected rate of return. This rate offers a com
promise between the current average of 7.6% being used and
the 2.7% recommended rate of the Hoover Institute Study at
Stanford University (Rauh, 2017). It also better incentivizes pen
sion fund managers to adopt a less risky approach, allowing
managers to diversify the portfolio with investments of lower
volatility. This discount rate could be used as an overall guide
line but would work better as a regulated percentage. If not
specifically legally mandated, each fund should implement a
discount rate based upon a disciplined approach as outlined
under their investment policy.
• Standards for pension board governance and structure
should be adopted. In a Sarbanes-Oxley type framework, pen
sion boards need to take greater responsibility in the gover
nance of pension plans. Instead of oversight being concentrated
with plan management, board governance should include a sep
arate investment committee. Direct reporting, hiring, and com
pensation of an independent investment advisor to the board is
an excellent starting point. This investment committee would
also be responsible for creating and approving the investment
policy. Actuarial consultants should be considered for direct re
porting to the board. In addition, discount rate determination
should be reviewed and formally approved by the board if not
regulated. Other areas of board management should include in
dependent external reviews, expertise requirements, conflicts of
interest checks, and auditor choice.
• Require a Board Passed Investment Policy that includes:
◦ Goals, expectations, objectives, and guidelines;

Type

Metric

Solvency

Funded Ratio

Solvency

Operating Margin

Benefit Payments - Employer and
Employee Contributions

Solvency

Operating Cash
Flow

Benefit Payments - Employer and
____ Employee Contributions
Assets

Risk

Volatility

Equity and Alternative Investments
Total Assets

Risk

Safety

Fixed and Treasury Investments
Total Assets

Benefit

Employee Burden

Benefit Payments - Employee Contributions

Benefit

Contribution Rate

Employee % of Salary paid toward pension

Measurement

_______ Assets_______
Accrued Pension Liability

Exhibit 5. Pension Fund Metrics.

◦ Requirements to perform risk analysis and set risk tolerance

using tools and analytics such as efficient frontier evaluation
which charts investments against risks;
◦ Set specific percentage ranges for individual investment cat
egories such as US Large Cap, US Small Cap, International
Developed, International Emerging, Diversified, Intermedi
ate, Global Bonds, Hedge Funds, Alternatives, Short Term
Treasuries;
◦ Analyze cash flow needs and adopt investment strategies
based on the timing of cash flows;
◦ Segment investment pools by maturity and types of invest
ments as follows - short-term (1-2 years), mid-range (3-8
years), intermediate (9-15 years), long-term (16 plus years);
◦ The mandatory hiring of an investment advisor that is inde
pendent of investment managers;
◦ Create investment manager criteria;
◦ Set performance objectives;
◦ Develop a transparent, understandable reporting and com
munication plan; and
◦ Perform an annual review of the investment policy.
• Creation of an independent oversight body should be ex
plored on a national level. Although difficult to implement na
tionally due to the states’ rights to regulate their public pension
plans, a PCAOB-type organization to guide or at least recom
mend quality controls, ethics, independence, financial reporting
and auditing rules could be beneficial. Although state and local
government plans themselves can only be regulated on a stateby-state basis; investment advisors, dealers, and brokers can be
regulated in a similar fashion as the Municipal Securities Rule
making Board (MRSB). A body of this type can also promote
transparency, create comprehensive databases of pension infor
mation, and set standards for investment advisors.
• Generally accepted metric development should occur. Cur
rently, the only metric that is commonly referred to or used
as a basis for decision making is the funded rate, which varies
depending on the discount rate being used. The Pew Charitable

Trusts (2018) has offered a new measure this year: Operating
Cash Flow. This metric is created by taking benefit payments
minus employer and employee contributions and dividing by
plan assets. It is a benchmark for the rate of return necessary
to ensure that asset balances do not decline. Other measures for
solvency, risk, and benefit should be developed. Exhibit 5 pro
vides a sample of metrics for consideration.
• Fiscal emergency policies should be legislated for pension
funds. Using several state budgetary laws as a design to build
from, each state should enact regulation that: (1.) sets criteria
to identify a funding crisis, (2.) outlines the steps that will be
taken once an emergency is declared, and (3.) defines the ap
pointment of a guiding authority while a plan is in crisis. For
example, 60% to 80% funding of a plan could be deemed fiscal
watch where the pension plan is given notice to improve. Below
60% funded could be declared a fiscal emergency. Once a plan is
declared to be in fiscal emergency, laws, and regulations should
specify that a state legislative committee, gubernatorial review
board, or receiver be appointed to address the issue with a re
quired strategy being adopted within a certain time period less
than a year.
• Additional actions to consider
◦ Auditors of public pension plans, whether DB or DC, should
be held to higher levels of accountability and exercise
greater professional skepticism.
◦ States should review long-range funding of DB plans and
budget accordingly.
◦ Benefit changes have already occurred in most states and
some more may be needed, however, this shift from DB to
DC to solve funding issues should not be the first solution
of choice as it has been.
◦ An independent professional consulting team to review ar
eas like management, procedures, and actuarial assumptions
should be used in public retirement plans. Such an external
team can also help implement policies not in place outlined
above.

Type of Regulatory Reform

Strategy Area

Funding Amount

Define fully funded at 80%

Discount Rate

Variable rate tied to 10-year Treasury rate

Board Governance

Define responsibilities and create an investment
committee

Investment Policy

Require Board passed investment policy including
guidelines, risk asset classes, and investment advisor

Independent Oversight

Create a nationally recognized organization to provide
guidance and rules

Metrics

Define, compute, and benchmark key ratios and
measures

Intervention triggers

Declaration of fiscal emergency for funded levels below
60%

Additional General

Audit, planning, consultation, leadership

Exhibit 6. Summary of Recommended Regulatory Pension Reform.

◦ Leadership, commitment, and fortitude must be exercised

by managers, board members, and public officials.
Exhibit 6 summarizes regulatory reform proposals.
10. Conclusion

The recent pronouncements of the GASB have brought to the
forefront the problems that public pension plans have been expe
riencing. Although the foundation of public pension plans has al
ready begun to erode from both a solvency and employee benefits
perspective, the human impact on the future wellbeing of public
employees and retirees should be considered along with the so
cietal impact. State lawmakers should begin consideration of en
acting and enforcing pension legislation similar to that of existing
balanced budget laws. National professional organizations should
band together to present leadership solutions for pension fund
managers and board members that include recommending a pru
dent discount rate, defining full funding, adopting a set of met
rics, guiding pension board governance, and providing direction on
investment policy. Advantages and disadvantages of DB plans, as
well as the financial costs versus human impact should be carefully
contemplated and included in the policy decision process. This pa
per offers specific recommendations on these matters to build pol
icy and regulatory solutions upon.
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